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ABSTRACT
The 2006 election for U.S. House of Representatives District 13 in Sarasota
County, Florida, attracted extensive controversy because an unusually high proportion
of the ballots cast lacked a vote for that office, and the unusual number of undervotes
probably changed the election outcome. Intensive technical studies based on examin-
ing software and hardware from the iVotronic touchscreen voting machines used to
conduct the election failed to find mechanical flaws sufficient to explain the under-
votes. Studies that examined the ballots used in Sarasota and in some other counties
concluded the high undervote rate was caused by peculiar features of the ballot's for-
mat that confused many voters. I show that recorded events involving power failures
and problems with the Personalized Electronic Ballots used with the machines cor-
relate significantly with undervote rates in several Florida counties. The relation-
ships between machine events and undervotes are sufficiently substantial and varied
to make it unreasonable to discount the likelihood that mechanical failures contributed
substantially to the high numbers of undervotes.
INTRODUCTION
The controversial election for U.S. House of Representatives District 13 (CD- 13)
in Florida in 2006 has been extensively investigated, but the basic question of what
happened with the electronic voting equipment used there remains unresolved. An
unusually large number of ballots cast in Sarasota County did not include a vote for
that office: 18,412 of the 238,249 ballots cast on iVotronic touchscreen machines in
the county were undervotes for that race.' Some of the research regarding the high
* Prepared for the symposium, "How We Vote," Institute of Bill of Rights Law, William
& Mary School of Law, Williamsburg, Virginia, March 14, 2008. 1 thank David Dill,
Maurice Tamman and Kitty Garber for data, and I thank Herbie Ziskend for assistance.
** Professor of Political Science and Professor of Statistics, University of Michigan. 7735
Haven Hall, Ann Arbor, Ml 48109-1045. Phone: 734-763-2220. Email: wmebane@umich.edu.
Voting Image and Log Files from David Dill, Professor, Stanford University, Jennifer
J. Edwards, Collier County Supervisor of Elections, Kitty Garber, Research Director, Florida
Fair Elections Center, Maurice Tamman, Staff Writer, Sarasota Herald Tribune (2006)
[hereinafter Voting Image and Log Files], available at http://www.umich.edu/-wmebane/
WRMreplic 13nov2008.zip.
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undervote rate has occurred in the context of litigation,2 some has been done by
independent scholars,3 some was sponsored by the State of Florida,4 and some was
conducted by the federal government.5 The unusually high undervote rate probably
changed the election outcome.6 Teams of computer scientists examined several fea-
tures of the software and hardware used to conduct the election but found nothing
they considered sufficient to warrant attributing the lost votes to defects in the equip-
ment's operations.7 Even though the adequacy of these technical examinations has
been seriously questioned,' many read the technical reports as largely exculpating the
machines.9 Hence, some argue that the high undervote rate was caused by peculiar
features of the ballot's format that confused many voters.'0
Frisina et al., in particular, use data from several counties in Florida to show that
the undervote rate for the attorney general race was also unusually high in several
counties when the choices for attorney general-for which, like CD- 13, there were
only two candidates running-were placed on the same screen as the governor's race,
which had many candidates." The correlation they demonstrate between the features
2 See id. at 5, 8-9; Declaration of Charles Stewart III on Excess Undervotes Cast in
Sarasota County, Florida for the 13th Congressional District Race, Jennings v. Elections
Canvassing Comm'n of the State of Fla., No. 2006-CA-2973, 2006 WL 4404531 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. Nov. 21, 2006).
a See Arlene Ash & John Lamperti, Florida 2006: Can Statistics Tell Us Who Won
Congressional District-13?, CHANCE, Spring 2008, at 18; Laurin Frisina et al., Ballot
Formats, Touchscreens, and Undervotes: A Study of the 2006 Midterm Elections in Florida,
7 ELECTION L.J. 25 (2008); Walter R. Mebane, Jr. & David L. Dill, Factors Associated with
the Excessive CD-13 Undervote in the 2006 General Election in Sarasota County, Florida
(Jan. 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/
FloridaFolder/smachines 1.pdf.
4 See, e.g., ALEC YASINSAC El AL., SOFrwAREREvIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE
ES&S IVOTRoNIc 8.0.1.2 VOTING MACHINE FIRMWARE (2007), available at http://election
.dos.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/FinalAudRepSAIT.pdf.
5 U.S. GOV'TACCOUNTABILTY OFFICE, GAO-08-97T, FURTHER TESTING COULD PROVIDE
INCREASED BUT NOT ABSOLUTE ASSURANCE THAT VOTING SYSTEMS DID NOT CAUSE UNDER-
VOTES IN FLORIDA'S 13TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (2007), available at http://www.gao
.gov/new.items/d0897t.pdf; U.S. GOV'TACCOUNTABILrrY OFFICE, GAO-08-425T, RESULTS
OF GAO'S TESTING OF VOTING SYSTEMS USED IN SARASOTA COUNTY IN FLORIDA'S 13TH
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT (2008) [hereinafter RESULTS OF GAO'S TESTING], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08425t.pdf.
6 See Ash & Lamperti, supra note 3, at 24.
7 See RESULTS OF GAO'S TESTING, supra note 5, at 3-4; YASINSAC ET AL., supra note 4.
8 See DAVID L. DILL& DAN S. WALLACH, STONES UNTURNED: GAPS IN THE INVESTIGATION
OFSARASOTA'S DSPUTEDCONGRESSIONALELECTION (2007), available at http://www.cs.rice
.edu/-dwallach/pub/sarasotaO7.html.
' See, e.g., Doug Sword, Machines Cleared in 2006 Vote Flap: GAO Says Touch-Screens
Didn't Cause Undervote, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. (Fla.), Feb. 7, 2008, at B 1.
'o See Frisina et al., supra note 3, at 25-26.
" Id. at 26, 32.
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of the ballot and the attorney general undervote rate is clear, but the explanation en-
tirely in terms of voter confusion is speculative. There is no direct supporting evi-
dence about the voters' experiences, although Selker reports some suggestive results
based on experiments conducted using subjects from Boston, Massachusetts.12 Frisina
et al. point out, however, that their results set the bar for any competing explanation
fairly high: "[A]ny explanation for the CD 13 undervote in Sarasota must be capable
of explaining the attorney general undervotes in Charlotte and Lee Counties and the
lack of an attorney general undervote elsewhere (not to mention the lack of high
undervotes in other races)."' 3
Recent reports examining the use and performance of touchscreen voting
machines across Florida in the 2006 election open the door to meeting the standard
Frisina et al. propose. 4 Pynchon and Garber document extensive problems with the
iVotronic machines that go well beyond the scope of the officially sponsored tech-
nical studies.'" They show that undervote rates for many races were higher in many
counties where iVotronic touchscreen machines were used, regardless of the ballot
format.'6 Among the physical problems they identify with the equipment, particularly
interesting is the suggestion that voting machine power failures occurred frequently
with strong adverse effects. 7 Garber remarks that "power supply failures were
experienced by voters and poll workers as screen problems.... [Plower problems can
affect the responsiveness of the screen. In fact, one of the first symptoms of a power
problem is diminished responsiveness."'"
Garber demonstrates that an error message that indicates that a voting machine
had a power failure correlates strongly with high undervote rates in Charlotte County. 9
2 Ted Selker, Study Shows Ballot Design and Voter Preparation Could Have Eliminated
Sarasota Florida Voting Errors (Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, VTP Working Paper
No. 61, 2008).
13 See Frisina et al., supra note 3, at 36.
14 Id. at 40.
"5 See SUSAN PYNCHON & KrTY GARBER, SARASOTA'S VANISHED VOTES: AN INVES-
TIGATION INTO THE CAUSE OF UNCOUNTED VOTES IN THE 2006 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 13
RACE IN SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA (2008), available at http://www.floridafairelections
.org/reportsNanishingVotes.pdf.
16 Id. at 84-86.
17 See Krrry GARBER, LOST VOTES IN FLORIDA'S 2006 GENERAL ELECTION: A LOOK AT
EXTRAORDNARY UNDERVOTE RATES ON THE ES&S IVOTRONIC (2007), available at http:l
www.floridafairelections.org/reportslLostVotesPart_ l.pdf; KIrY GARBER, LOST VOTES IN
FLORIDA'S 2006 GENERAL ELECTION: A LOOK AT EXTRAORDINARY UNDERVOTE RATES ON
THEES&S IVOTRONIC (2008) [hereinafter GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 21, available at http:I/
www.floridafairelections.org/reports/LostVotes-Part_2.pdf; PYNCHON & GARBER, supra
note 15, at 36-40.
18 GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 2, supra note 17, at 9, 32.
'9 See id. at 35-37.
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Indeed, in that county, machines in the same precinct as a machine with a power
failure message also tend to exhibit high undervote rates.2' Garber suggests that
power-related problems propagated among machines because "counties link their
machines together at the polling place in what is termed a 'daisy chain.' The first
machine is plugged into the wall outlet, the second is plugged into the first, the third
into the second, and so on."21
Another possible hole in Frisina et al.'s explanation is their failure to recognize that
with iVotronic touchscreen equipment, a distinctive ballot pattern is in fact a distinc-
tive software and hardware configuration.22 iVotronic machines use a device called
a "Personalized Electronic Ballot" (PEB) to load the candidate selection displays into
the voting machine for each voter.23 Indeed, most interactions with the iVotronic ma-
chines involve the use of a PEB.24 When a ballot has a different appearance, the PEBs
contain different programming. 25 None of the technical examinations of the equip-
ment used in Sarasota ever examined the PEBs that were used to conduct the election.26
Mebane and Dill demonstrate that several PEB-related error messages correlate sig-
nificantly with variations in the Sarasota CD-13 undervote rate.27 It is possible, then,
that the adverse consequences of ballot format that Frisina et al. demonstrate should
be explained, at least in part, as results of deficient mechanical operations connected
to the PEBs. 28
Indeed, as I will show in the remainder of this Article, both power failure prob-
lems and PEB-related problems correlate significantly with undervote rates in several
Florida counties.29 The analysis includes data from nine Florida counties that used
iVotronic touchscreen voting machines: Charlotte, Collier, Lake, Lee, Martin, Miami-
Dade, Pasco, Sarasota, and Sumter counties.30 Three of these counties (Charlotte,
Lee, and Sumter) used ballot formats precisely of the kind Frisina et al. flag as prob-
lematic for the attorney general race." Ballot formats used in Miami-Dade County
20 Id. at 35.
21 Id. at 19.
22 See Frisina et al., supra note 3 (arguing that the ballot design, not the technology, was
to blame for undervotes in Sarasota County).
23 Mebane & Dill, supra note 3, at 3.
24 See id. (noting that PEBs are used for opening and closing the iVotronic machines, for
cancelling ballots, and for voting).
25 See YASINSAC ETAL.., supra note 4, at 10 (explaining that election staff creates unique
election identification codes, defines contests, and identifies the candidates in each contest;
each PEB contains this information for the specific precinct at which it will be used).
26 PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 29.
27 Mebane & Dill, supra note 3, at 5.
28 Frisina et al., supra note 3, at 36.
29 See infra p. 388 tbl.6, pp. 389-90 tbl.7, pp. 390-91 tbl.8, p. 391 tbl.9, p. 392 tbl.10,
p. 393 tbl.11, p. 394 tbl.12.
30 See infra pp. 380-81 tbl.1, pp. 381-82 tbl.2.
31 See Frisina et al., supra note 3, at 27-29.
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exhibited the key feature of having offices with differing numbers of candidate
choices on the same screen.32 Lake and Pasco Counties used ballot formats with
offices arranged in two columns on each screen instead of the single-column formats
used elsewhere.33 Ballot formats used in the remaining counties lack purportedly
problematic features.' The prevalence of observable problems with PEBs and power
varies across the counties, and the apparent consequences for undervote rates are
diverse. The magnitude of the effects varies both across counties and across offices,
tending to be larger for races that have substantially larger undervote rates. 35 The
results, I suggest, breathe new life into the likelihood that high rates of undervoting
in Florida in 2006 were substantially due to mechanical failures.
MECHANICAL EVENTS AND UNDERVOTES
The foundation for my analysis is the set of vote image and event log files that
report, respectively, each ballot cast and every transaction occurring on each iVotronic
voting machine used by each county during the 2006 election.36 Each vote image file
contains records showing every candidate selection made on an individual ballot, in-
cluding a code to indicate the voting machine, PEB, and ballot style used to capture
the selections.37 Cast ballots that contain no candidate selections are also shown.38
Each event log file shows many of the actions taken on each machine, including a
timestamp for each transaction. 39 Tables I and 2 summarize the event log file contents
for the counties used in the current analysis. In the event log files, each transaction
is described by a numeric code and a brief descriptive phrase ° Events 20 and 21 cor-
respond to vote casting events.41 For each of these events, there is a corresponding
record in the vote image file.42 Because the vote records are supposedly included in
the vote image file in a random order, to protect voter anonymity, it is not possible to
match a particular set of votes to a particular event log file transaction.
32 Michael C. Herron, Ballot Format Effects in the 2006 Midterm Elections in Florida,
at slides 23-24 (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.dartmouth.edu/-herron/hearing.pdf.
33 Id. at slide 21.
I d. at slide 19.
3 See infra pp. 385-86 tbl.4, p. 388 tbl.6, pp. 389-90 tbl.7, pp. 390-91 tbl.8, p. 391
tbl.9, p. 392 tbl.10, p. 393 tbl.11, p. 394 tbl.12.
36 Voting Image and Log Files, supra note 1.
37 id.
38 id.
39 id.
40 See id.
41 id.
42 Id.
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Table 1: Events Recorded in Event Log Files for Several Florida Counties in
2006
County
Code Description Charlotte Collier Lake Lee Martin
01 Terminal clear
and test
02 Terminal screen
calibrate
04 Enter service
menu
05 Service password
14 35 219
17 1033 1148
3 16
Enter ECA menu
ECA password
08 Date/time change
09 Terminal open
10 Terminal close
12 Audit upload
13 Print zero tape
14 Print Precinct
results
15 Modem Precinct
results
17 Votes recollect
18 Invalid vote PEB
19 Invalid super
PEB
20 Normal ballot
cast
21 Super ballot cast
22 Super ballot
cancel
25 Open with super
votes
26 Terminal left
open
974
1773
1773
0
398
0
0 0 2
0
166
1920
45993 70069 75292 130125 44178
0 0
0 0 0
0 0
0 0
1775
5 78
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27 Override
28 Override fail
31 Term. clear/test
password fail
35 Modem Precinct
results fail
36 Low battery
lockout
37 Nonmaster PEB
collection
49 Internal
malfunction
50 L and A test
run-Votes
cleared
51 PEB/CF Election
ID mismatch
2054
33
3
2183
31
1
0 0 0
35 57 58 87 26
3 10 11
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
Table 2: Events Recorded in Event Log Files for Several Florida Counties in
2006
Code Description Miami-Dade
County
Pasco Sarasota
01 Terminal clear
and test
02 Terminal screen
calibrate
04 Enter service
menu
05 Service password
fail
06 Enter ECA menu
07 ECA password
fail
08 Date/time change
09 Terminal open
10 Terminal close
12 Audit upload
13 Print zero tape
4682 1416
4404
7387
5091
4680
4673
1
1986
9
7
0
11
1441
1408
861
169
1616
10
0
0 0
2 6
0 0
0 0
2 0
Sumter
1503 250
57
1503
1503
0
366
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14 Print Precinct
results
15 Modem Precinct
results
17 Votes recollect
18 Invalid vote PEB
19 Invalid super
PEB
20 Normal ballot
cast
21 Super ballot cast
22 Super ballot
cancel
25 Open with super
votes
26 Terminal left
open
27 Override
28 Override fail
31 Term. clear/test
password fail
35 Modem Precinct
results fall
36 Low battery
lockout
37 Nonmaster PEB
collection
49 Internal
malfunction
50 L and A test
run-Votes
cleared
51 PEB/CF Election
ID mismatch
6
0
2
1377
515
6
4
1
205
57
79115 113429 119772 27399
875
2700
1
2
9276
217
39
0
409
17
Several transaction codes in the event log files indicate events that may be rele-
vant for studying undervote rates. A need to calibrate the terminal screen (event 02)
may suggest misalignment between where vote choices display on the screen and
[Vol. 17:375
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where touching the screen activates each choice.43 Such misalignment can cause votes
to be misrecorded or lost.' Other events indicate problems with passwords or pos-
sibly inappropriate access to service menus, and suggest possible security failures
(events 05, 06, 07, and 31). Still other events indicate various malfunctions (events
36 and 49) or some problem with PEBs (events 18, 19, 37, and 51). The record of
problems contained in the event log files is not necessarily complete. There are sev-
eral documented instances in which problems with iVotronic machines may have
caused the event log files to be corrupted.' A bug diagnosed in 2003-2004 in partic-
ular causes incomplete records in some cases where the power supplied to a machine
fails.' Whether that bug or other problems affected the event log files available from
the 2006 election is unknown.
For the current analysis I focus on two kinds of events. Event 18 ("Invalid vote
PEB") flags a PEB-related error and was a focus of a study of data from Sarasota
County by Mebane and Dill.47 Event 36 ("Low battery lockout") is the event used by
Garber to indicate that a voting machine experienced a power failure.48 Because it
is not possible to match particular events to particular individual vote records, nor in
general to tell whether a particular vote occurred prior to an event of interest, I define
variables to indicate whether a particular voting machine has an occurrence of event
18 (E18) or event 36 (E36).
In light of Pynchon and Garber' s observation about voting machines being "daisy
chained," with the likelihood that any consequences of power problems on one machine
propagated to other machines connected to it,49 I also define a variable to indicate
whether voting machines were in the same location as another machine that had a
power failure. No data exist to show which machines were actually connected to one
another in each polling place. Garber used the fact of being in the same precinct to
measure such connections on election day in Charlotte County.5' I use an alternative
proxy: machines are considered to be related according to E36 if the same PEB was
ever used on both of the machines. If machine A is related to machine B by a PEB,
and machine B is related to machine C by another PEB, then all three machines are
considered to be part of the same PEB cluster. All machines in the same PEB cluster
are considered to be at the same location. The power-location variable E36L is set on
for all machines in a cluster whenever any machine in the cluster has an occurrence
of E36. The rationale for this measure is that machines that were used with the same
PEB probably were located close to one another in the polling place, and machines
that were located close to one another were more likely to have been daisy chained.
13 See Dill & Wallach, supra note 8, at 4.
4Id.
4' See PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 57.
4 Id. at 43-45.
'4 See Mebane & Dill, supra note 3, at 5-6.
48 GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 2, supra note 17, at 36-39.
49 PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 40.
50 GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 2, supra note 17, at 36-37.
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Table 3 shows the distribution of the three event-measuring variables in terms of
the number and proportion of ballots cast on the affected machines in each county.
E18 occurs much more frequently during early voting than on election day.5 Typi-
cally about half of the early voting ballots are on machines that have an occurrence
of E18, while on election day the frequency ranges from a low of 6.8% in Sumter
County up to about a quarter of the ballots in Lee, Martin, and Miami-Dade Counties.
The frequency of E36 is relatively low on election day, ranging from 1.2% in Sumter
County to 3.9% in Lake County. Taking PEB clusters into account in most counties
greatly increases the number of ballots potentially affected. Sumter County remains
relatively low, with 3.1% of ballots having a positive value for E36L, but the percent-
age for Lake County jumps to 26.6, and Miami-Dade County tops the percentages
with a value of 27.4. Only four counties (Charlotte, Collier, Lake, and Lee) show
substantial proportions of ballots on machines or in PEB clusters with power failure
indicators during early voting.
Table 3: Frequency of Invalid Vote PEB and Low Battery Lockout Events
Election Day
E36
2.2
2.6
3.9
1.9
3.5
3.6
1.4
1.4
1.2
Election Day
E36
629
1259
Percentages
E36L E18
9.9
20.8
26.6
19.1
17.1
27.4
15.1
12.8
3.1
52.6
41.7
41.7
26.5
64.3
a
41.1
54.0
40.7
Counts
E36L E18
2864
10169
9005
8823
Early Voting
E36
4.6
3.9
2.5
2.5
0
a
0
.1
0
Early Voting
E36
787
833
" Whether a machine was used during early voting or on election day is determined from
the timestamps for the events reported for the machine. For Miami-Dade County, none of the
event records have a timestamp prior to election day. See Voting Image and Log Files, supra
note 1.
County
Charlotte
Collier
Lake
Lee
Martin
Miami
Pasco
Sarasota
Sumter
County
Charlotte
Collier
E18
12.4
15.1
14.7
24.2
23.5
23.9
11.6
13.0
6.8
E18
3576
7393
E36L
13.9
21.9
18.2
23.5
0
a
E36L
2374
4638
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Lake 8649 2299 15615 6979 421 3050
Lee 26178 2044 20655 5835 545 5174
Martin 6644 987 4836 10250 0 0
Miami 66946 10132 76706 -a - a -a
Pasco 10936 1341 14240 7816 0 0
Sarasota 11578 1244 11415 16681 21 21
Sumter 830 152 379 6209 0 0
Note: Percentages and counts of ballots on a machine with the indicated event in each
county. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster, a Early voting data not available.
A ballot has an undervote for an office if the vote image does not include a can-
didate choice for the office. 2 For offices that appear on the ballot only in specific
jurisdictions, such as U.S. House elections, a non-vote is an undervote only if the
vote image is for a precinct and ballot style that indicates the voter is eligible to vote
for the candidates in the referent jurisdiction. I focus on votes for five statewide
offices (Governor, Attorney General, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Commissioner
of Agriculture, and U.S. Senate) and for seats in the U.S. House of Representatives.
Table 4 shows the distribution of undervotes for these various offices across the nine
counties. Undervote rates are typically lowest for governor and U.S. Senate, and in
many instances they are also low for U.S. House seats. Undervote rates are noticeably
higher for commissioner of agriculture and CFO, and they vary quite widely for attorney
general. The three attorney general undervote rates that are greater than 20%-for
Charlotte, Lee and Sumter Counties-are for the counties where the attorney general
race appeared on the same page with the governor's race. 3 Among the U.S. House
races, the CD-13 race has the second highest undervote percentage. 4 The result for
the U.S. House race with the highest percentage-CD-17 in Miami-Dade-is almost
certainly explained by the fact that the Democratic candidate in that district did not
face a major party challenger.
Table 4: Undervote Percentages by Office
County
Office Charlotte Collier Lake Lee Martin Miami Pasco Sarasota Sumter
Att'y Gen. 24.7 3.5 3.8 20.7 3.3 9.6 4.9 4.7 23.9
Comm'r Agric. 5.7 7.5 4.9 5.8 8.0 8.0 5.5 5.3 6.3
52 See Voting Image and Log Files, supra note 1.
5 See PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 82.
4 id.
386 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 17:375
CFO 3.7 6.6 5.4 3.4 7.7 9.5 3.8 4.5 3.7
Governor .8 .7 1.0 .7 .8 1.5 .8 1.4 .9
US House 1.8 2.0 5.9 1.4 1.1 9.5 5.2 14.9 2.5
a a a a a aUS House 5 -- 7.2 _ - - 6.0 - 2.5
a a a a a a a aUS House 6 - - 7.8 _ - - - - -
US House 8 . a a 2.8 a a a a a a
a a a a a a a a
US House 9 .- - a 4.3 -a -a
US House 13 2.4 a a a a -a a 14.9 a
US House 14 2.1 1.9 - a 1.4 -a a a a a
US House 16 1.5 a a a 1.1 a a a a
a a a a a a a a
US Housel17 - - - - - 16.4 _
a a a a a a a aUS House 18 . a - a 5.7 _ - a
US House 21 a a a a a 8.5 a a a
a a a a a a a
US House 25 - 2.7 - - 7.8 - - -
US Senate 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 4.7 1.6 1.2 1.3
Note: Undervotes as percentage of all ballots cast. Results for "US House" with a
district include only ballots in the referent district. "US House" with no district com-
bines all districts for each county. a Office not included in county.
The standard proposed by Frisina et al. calls for effects of the invalid PEB and
power failure events on the undervote rate that vary across counties, 55 but nonethe-
less, it is worthwhile to begin by looking at the average rate of undervoting for each
combination of the events, ignoring any differences among counties. Table 5 shows
undervote rates for each office for combinations of the two kinds of events, separately
for election day and early voting ballots but pooling across all counties. For this
display, the undervote counts for all U.S. House seats are treated together.
Table 5: Undervote Percentages by Occurrence of Machine Events
No E36 No E36L
Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting
Office NoE18 E18 NoE18 E18 NoE18 E18 NoEl8 E18
Att'y Gen. 9.7 10.7 10.3 9.7 9.8 10.7 10.1 9.5
Comm'r Agric. 6.6 7.1 5.4 5.4 6.5 7.0 5.4 5.4
CFO 6.3 7.2 4.4 4.3 6.1 7.1 4.3 4.3
" See Frisina et al., supra note 3 (observing anomalous undervoting at the precinct level).
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Governor 1.1 1.3 .8 1.0 1.1 1.2 .8 1.0
US House 6.7 7.3 6.3 7.4 6.7 7.2 6.9 8.1
US Senate 2.5 3.0 1.0 .9 2.4 2.8 1.0 .9
E36 E36L
Election Day Early Voting Election Day Early Voting
Office No E18 E18 No El8 E18 NoEl8 E18 No E18 E18
Att'y Gen. 9.8 10.3 14.7 2.1 9.2 10.7 12.2 11.1
Comn'r Agric. 7.5 7.6 5.7 6.9 6.9 7.5 5.5 5.7
CFO 7.3 9.0 4.2 6.5 6.9 7.9 4.6 4.5
Governor 1.4 1.5 .7 .8 1.1 1.3 .6 .8
US House 7.6 7.2 2.1 1.9 7.0 7.6 2.1 1.9
US Senate 3.3 3.6 1.2 1.9 3.0 3.6 1.1 1.1
Note: Undervote percentages with and without the indicated type of event, pooling
data from all nine counties. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine.
E36L: event 36 on a machine in the ballot' s PEB cluster. "US House" includes all
districts in all counties.
In the subtable showing the breakdowns among the election day ballots, in the
absence of a power failure indication for the particular machine (No E36) or for the
PEB cluster (No E36L), the undervote rate is always higher on machines that have an
invalid vote PEB event than on machines that do not have such an event. The largest
such differences are differences of 1% for attorney general in the No E36 case and for
the CFO in the No E36L case. Other races in these same conditions typically show
a difference of about half a percent in the undervote rate across values of El 8, except
for the governor race where the differences are smaller. In the subtable showing the
election day breakdowns in the presence of power failures (E36 or E36L), the pattern
of differences in the undervote rate across values of E18 is similar except the differ-
ences are smaller. Also, there is one reversal: for U.S. House with E36, the under-
vote percentage is smaller with E18 than it is with No El8. An invalid vote PEB
event is on average typically associated with a higher undervote rate on election day.
In the subtables showing the undervote percentage breakdowns for early voting
ballots, the differences with respect to E18 do not exhibit a consistent pattern.
Focusing on the differences with respect to E36 and E36L for comparable values
of E 18, among the election day ballots the undervote rate is typically greater for an
office for the ballots that have E36 or E36L than for ballots that have No E36 or No
E36L. Power failures are on average typically associated with a higher undervote rate
on election day. Again, the pattern of differences among the early voting ballots is
mixed.
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In terms of gross averages, then, each of the two types of voting machine events
is typically associated with a tendency to have a higher undervote rate, at least among
election day ballots. In view of the large number of ballots being considered across
all nine counties, it is perhaps not surprising that most of the differences apparent in
Table 5 are statistically significant if all of the votes for each office are treated as sta-
tistically independent of one another. Nonetheless, the differences across conditions
in Table 5 are small as percentages of ballots cast, and of course the overall averages
do not address the need to demonstrate that the differences vary across counties.
Table 6 presents the first set of results that bear on the question of diverse effects.
The table shows the simple percentage difference in the undervote rate for each office
in a single county when the condition measured by each of the event variables is, respec-
tively, present versus absent. I assess the statistical significance of each difference by
testing for independence between each event variable and a variable measuring whether
each ballot has an undervote for the respective office. The test level is the conven-
tional value .05, but symbols in the table also address the fact that across the whole
analysis we are looking at dozens of separate tests. One symbol indicates that an asso-
ciation is significant even when we adjust for the number of tests being done for an
event in the particular county, and one indicates significance even when we adjust for
the number of tests being done in all nine counties.56
Table 6: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine Events I
Sarasota
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. .2 .5 .1 -.2 .3 .3
Comm'r Agric. .3 -.2 .0 -2.0 4.6 4.6
CFO .3 -.5 .2 -.4 -4.0 -4.0
Governor .0 .3 .3* .1 3.4 3.4
US House 13 .9* 2.3* .8* -2.4t -12.9 -12.9
US Senate .0 .2 .0 -. 1 -.9 -.9
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. El8 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at level
.05; :: at level .05 adjusting for tests across all counties.
56 1 use the Bonferroni adjustment. Letting mjdenote the number of offices being analyzed
in countyj and m the number summing across all nine counties the single test level is .05, the
within county test level is .05/mj, and the cross-county test level is .05/m. Pearson chi-squared
is the test statistic.
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The results in Table 6 show undervote rate differences for Sarasota County.
The substantial and significant differences occur mainly for the CD- 13 race. There
are significant differences for E18 among both the election day and the early voting
ballots. Oddly, the direction of the difference varies between the two election
periods. The undervote rate is lower on machines with an invalid vote PEB event
during early voting, but the rate is higher on such machines on election day. Also,
among the election day ballots, the undervote percentage is higher in the presence
of a power failure event. The effect is smaller for E36L than for E36, but it is large
enough to give some support to the idea that the consequences of power failure
propagated among nearby machines.5 7
The results for Charlotte and Sumter Counties likewise show substantial differ-
ences in the undervote rate occurring largely for the office that was subject to the
peculiar ballot feature.5" In both counties there are significant relationships between
power failure events and election day attorney general undervote rates. Table 7
shows the significant differences for Charlotte County are of comparable magnitude
whether machine-specific events or PEB cluster events are considered. There are also
significant power-related increases in the undervote rate for a few of the other offices,
but these increases are smaller in magnitude than the increases for the attorney general
race. Table 7 shows that in Sumter County power failures are associated with sig-
nificant decreases in the election day attorney general undervote rate. In Sumter on
election day, there is also a significant increase in the CD-5 undervote rate associated
with machine-specific power failure events. Neither county exhibits significant under-
vote rate differences associated with invalid vote PEB events, except for a small de-
cline in the early voting governor undervote rate that achieves single-test significance.
Table 7: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events H
Charlotte
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. -.1 5.6t 4.6f: .3 -1.8 -.8
Comm'r Agric. -.7 2.5* 1.8: .4 .7 .0
CFO .1 .0 1.0* .3 -.5 -.8*
Governor -.2 .4 .4 .2 -.4 -.2
US House .2 .6 .7* -. 1 .5 .6
" Table 3 shows that nine times as many ballots have a positive value for E36L as have
a positive value for E36, but the percentage difference in Table 6 is not correspondingly nine
times smaller. Compare supra pp. 384-85 tbl.3, with supra p. 388 tbl.6.
5 See infra pp. 389-90 tbl.7.
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US House 13
US House 14
US House 16
US Senate
.5 .9 1.1
.1 _ b b
.2 .5 .5
.2 1.4* .4
-.6 .4 .1
.0 -.4 -.2
.2 -1.4 -1.4
.0 -.5 -.3
Sumter
Office
Att'y Gen.
Comm'r Agric.
CFO
Governor
US House 5
US Senate
E18
-.9
.0
-.2
-.1
-.8
-.2
Election Day
E36
-6.6*
.9
-1.3
.4
3.2*
-.1
E36L
-5.5*
-1.3
-.5
E18
-.3
.4
-.1
Early Voting
E36
b
b
b
b
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at
level .05; t: at level .05 adjusting for all tests in this county; t: at level .05 adjusting
for tests across all counties. Results for "US House" with a district number include
only ballots in the referent district. "US House" with no district number combines
all districts for each county. b No events.
Lee County provides the principal exception to the general finding that under-
vote rates for the office that appeared with the peculiar ballot feature are signifi-
cantly associated with invalid vote PEB or power failure events. Table 8 shows no
significant differences for the attorney general race. A significant increase in the
election day commissioner of agriculture undervote rate is associated with invalid
vote PEB events.
Table 8: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events EI
Lee
Election Da)
E18 E36Office E36L E18
Early Voting
E36
Att'y Gen.
Comm'r Agric.
CFO
-.6 -.4
E36L
b
b
b
b
b
b
E36L
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Governor .1 .2 -.1 .1 .2 .0
US House 14 .1 .4 -.1 -.2 -.9* .1
US Senate .1 -.1 .0 -.1 -.4 -.2
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at
level .05; t: at level .05 adjusting for all tests in this county.
The results for Collier County, reported in Table 9, show no significant election
day undervote rate differences. Among the early voting ballots one significant in-
crease in undervote rates (for the governor race) is associated with invalid vote PEB
events, one is associated with machine-level power failures (for the U.S. Senate race)
and one is associated with PEB cluster-level power failures (for the combined U.S.
House races, but principally for the CD- 14 race). Frisina et al. place Collier County
in contrast to Charlotte and Lee Counties because the ballot format used in Collier did
not have the purportedly confusing feature of races with very different numbers of
candidate choices placed together on the same screen.59 Frisina et al. do not consider
undervote rates in the early voting data.'
Table 9: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events IV
Collier
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. -.1 .0 .0 .1 -.4 .3
Comm'r Agric. .0 -.1 -.3 .6 .0 .0
CFO -.2 -.4 -.2 .1 .6 .8
Governor -.1 .2 .0 .2* -. 1 .0
US House .0 .3 -.1 .1 .4 .5*
US House 14 .1 .5 .0 .1 .4 .5
US House 25 -.3 -.3 -.4 .4 .0 .0
US Senate .2 .1 .2 .2 1.1* .1
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
'9 See Frisina et al., supra note 3, at 34.
60 See id.
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on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at level
.05. Results for "US House" with a district number include only ballots in the referent
district. "US House" with no district number combines all districts for each county.
The ballot format used in Martin County exhibited no remarkable features, yet
Table 10 shows a significant association between machine events and undervote rates
for a couple of offices. For CFO there is an early voting association with invalid vote
PEB events and an election day association with machine-level power failure events.
There is also a significant negative association between election day attorney general
undervotes and PEB cluster-level power failure events. Garber observes that the
voting machines in Martin County had maintenance histories that differed in several
respects from what was done in other Florida counties and that officials in Martin
County exerted special efforts to recalibrate the screens of the voting machines.6
Table 10: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events V
Martin
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. -.1 -.7 -.6* .2 -b -b
Comm'r Agric. .3 1.3 -.1 .5 -b
CFO .6 1.9* .1 1.ot -b -b
Governor .0 -.3 -.1 .2 -b -b
US House 16 .1 .5 -.1 .2 -b -b
US Senate .2 .6 .2 .2 -b -b
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at
level .05; t: at level .05 adjusting for all tests in this county. b No events.
The ballot format used in Miami-Dade County differed in significant respects
from the ballot format used in the other counties, featuring in particular the property
of having offices with very different numbers of candidate choices together on the
same screen.62 As Table 11 shows, the county also exhibits a large number of signifi-
cant associations between election day undervote rates and machine events. Every
office except CD-21 has a significant association between the undervote rate and
61 See GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 2, supra note 17, at 40-42.
62 See Herron, supra note 32, at slides 23, 24.
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either invalid vote PEB events or power failure events, and several offices show sig-
nificant associations with both kinds of events.
Table 11: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events VI
Miami-Dade
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. .3* .7t -.1 a - - -
Comm'r Agric. .1 .7* .2 - a - a - a
CFO .6t .4 -. 1 - a - a - a
Governor .2It .2 .0 - a - a - a
US House .8t -. 1 -.3t - a - a - a
US House 17 -.3 -. 2 L.ot a - a - a
US House 18 .6* 1.1* -.1 a a a
US House 21 -. 1 -.6 -.4 -a - - a
US House 25 .4 -.5 -.9t -a - - a
US Senate .1 .3 .2* -a -a a
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at level
.05; t: at level .05 adjusting for all tests in this county; t: at level .05 adjusting for
tests across all counties. Results for "US House" with a district number include only
ballots in the referent district. "US House" with no district number combines all
districts for each county. a Early voting data not available.
Lake and Pasco Counties differ from the other iVotronic counties because the
ballot formats used in the two counties presented choices on the voting machine
screens in two columns.63 Table 12 shows that between the two counties the asso-
ciations between undervote rates and machine events differ considerably. In Lake
County, undervotes for almost every office are significantly associated with one or
the other type of machine event, and sometimes with both types. Only the governor
race and perhaps the race for CD-8 are exempt. In Pasco County, only two offices
exhibit a significant association between undervote rates and one of the machine
events: PEB cluster-level power failures are negatively associated with election day
63 See Herron, supra note 32, at slide 21; see also E-mail from Kitty Garber, Research
Director, Florida Fair Elections Center, to Walter R. Mebane, Jr., Professor of Political Science
and Statistics, University of Michigan (Mar. 8, 2008, 20:02:55 EST) (on file with author).
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attorney general undervotes and positively related to U.S. House undervotes. The
latter association manifestly does not describe the separate congressional districts,
so on the whole the evidence for substantial machine event associations with
undervote rates in Pasco County should be viewed as weak. It is not the appearance
of the ballots that sharply distinguishes the undervote experience in these two coun-
ties. Rather, it is the association with voting machine error conditions that differs.
Table 12: Undervote Percentage Differences by Occurrence of Machine
Events VII
Lake
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. .3 .7 -. 1 .0 .1 -.7*
Comm'r Agric. .5 1.2* .2 -.2 -.5 -.4
CFO .2 1.2* .1 -.3 -.6 -.5
Governor .2 .2 .0 -.1 .5 .2
US House .7* 1.5* .7t -.4 -1.1 -2.2t
US House 5 .5 1.1 -.9* .5 -.2 .8
US House 6 -.1 1.3 1.6* -1.3 -6.9 -3.9
US House 8 .0 1.4 .6 -.6 1.0 .0
US Senate .1 .7t -. 1 -.3* .9 .5*
Pasco
Election Day Early Voting
Office E18 E36 E36L E18 E36 E36L
Att'y Gen. .1 -.4 -.4* .1 -b -b
Comm'r Agric. .1 -.1 .0 .1 - -b
CFO .1 -.8 -.2 -.3 -b -b
Governor .1 .2 .0 .0 -b -b
US House .4 .6 .5* .3 - -b
US House 5 .5 .3 .1 .6 -b -b
US House 9 -.1 -1.3 -.6 -.1 -b -b
US Senate .0 -.2 .0 -. 1 -b -b
Note: Differences between undervote percentages with and without the indicated type
of event. E18 and E36: events 18 and 36 on the ballot's machine. E36L: event 36
on a machine in the ballot's PEB cluster. *: Two-way association significant at level
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.05; t: at level .05 adjusting for all tests in this county;f: at level .05 adjusting for
tests across all counties. Results for "US House" with a district include only ballots
in the referent district. "US House" with no district combines all districts for each
county. bNo events.
CONCLUSION
Plainly the two kinds of PEB and machine events examined here are not sufficient
to explain the pattern of undervotes, neither in the CD- 13 race in Sarasota County
nor in the other Florida counties included here. The measured events are not always
associated with high undervote rates (e.g., Lee County), and even where there are
strong associations, the magnitude of the apparent effects is usually too small to fully
account for a high proportion of the undervotes that occurred. In a few instances, the
invalid vote PEB or power failure events are associated with declines, not increases,
in the percentage of undervotes. Citing the kinds of events studied here hardly settles
the question of what caused the excessive numbers of undervotes.
The point of the current exercise is not to supply an adequate explanation for
the undervotes, but merely to demonstrate that the relationships between machine
events and undervotes are sufficiently substantial and varied to make it unreasonable
to discount the likelihood that mechanical failures contributed substantially to the high
numbers of undervotes. In three of the four cases considered by Frisina et al.' and
Selker,65 where ballot format purportedly confused voters and consequently pro-
duced dramatic increases in undervoting-the CD-13 race in Sarasota County and
the attorney general race in Charlotte, Lee and Sumter Counties-I find significant
associations between invalid vote PEB events or power failure events and substan-
tial variations in undervoting, particularly for the offices of interest. Even if one
focuses narrowly on those four races in those places, there is every reason not to
rule out mechanical effects. Undervotes also appear significantly related to events for
other offices in other counties. Of the nine counties examined here, only Collier and
Pasco Counties emerge relatively unscathed in terms of significant associations be-
tween events and election day undervotes. When early voting is included, no county
escapes unblemished.
When thinking about the small magnitude of the percentage differences associated
with the invalid vote PEB and power failure events, it is important to remember that
the event log file entries that are the basis for measuring these conditions are at best
symptoms of whatever was wrong with the PEBs, machines, or polling environments
where the problems occurred. There is reason to believe the event logs do not include
every occurrence even of the precise kinds of flaws in focus here. Recall, for instance,
the software bug diagnosed in 2003-2004 that sometimes caused events not to be
64 See Frisina et al., supra note 3.
65 See Selker, supra note 12.
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reported in cases of power failure. 66 And it is merely a hypothesis that the two kinds
of events highlighted here are especially important markers for high undervotes. As
we saw in Tables 1 and 2, several other kinds of events might well also indicate condi-
tions that produce excessive undervotes. The current analysis most likely understates
how much mechanical defects contributed to the problem of excessive undervotes
in the 2006 election.
A definitive explanation for the undervotes requires technical examinations of
the hardware, software, and practices used in the election that go considerably beyond
the officially sponsored reviews that have occurred. Detailed administrative and
maintenance records of the kind partially collected and reviewed by Pynchon and
Garber67 are needed to supplement the kinds of tests described by Dill and Wallach68
and others. Unfortunately, it is likely that we will never have a sufficient explanation
for the pattern of undervotes in the 2006 election. Key equipment, such as the PEBs
actually used during the election, has not been preserved.69 Experts have not been
allowed sufficient latitude to fully test even the equipment, both hardware and soft-
ware, that was preserved.70 From some counties it is impossible to obtain the necessary
kinds of administrative records, and for others to do so is infeasible.
Nonetheless, simply because a sufficient explanation is not forthcoming, there is
no reason to treat a partial and incomplete explanation as if it were adequate. While
it is tempting to fall back on an explanation that blames the voters-were voters
confused?-there is not sufficient evidence to support doing that. While undoubtedly
voter confusion prompted by unfortunate ballot formats had a hand in increasing the
number of undervotes for some offices, the magnitude of this effect is unclear, and
clearly that is not all of what happened.
66 See PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 43-45.
67 See PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15.
68 See Dill & Wallach, supra note 8.
9 See PYNCHON & GARBER, supra note 15, at 29 (suggesting that it may be too late to
examine the PEBs actually used in the election).
70 See GARBER, LOST VOTES PART 2, supra note 17, at 48.
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